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No Need for Morality: The Case of the Competithe �tarket 
by 
Da,·id Gauthier 
Morality is a Visible Fool. This unappealing metaphor 1s derived. of coum'. 
from Adam Smith's Invisible Hand. Where the Invisible Hand fails to direct each 
person's actions to the public interest · or. as l shall prefer to say. lo mutual bene­
fit · the Visible Foot takes over. Hand and Fool share a common aim. But they 
work in very different ways. 
Ogden Nash, whose philosophical insights I have long admired. was wont to 
lament: 
"O Duty! 
Why hast thou not the visage of a sweetie or a cutic?"l 
But allurement is not duty's way. Even prudence is nol in that line of business. and 
prudence does not take us beyond our own interests. Morality insists that we re­
strain our pursuit of those interests. The Invisible Hand draws us on with no felt 
pressure. But the Visible Foot is encased in a good, solid boot, to be applied firmly 
to our backsides in order to redirect our concerns when individual gain and mutual 
benefit diverge. 
But do we need a kick in the backside? Must morality always be with us? 
Morality is a constraint on the pursuit of self-interest. A constraint needs justifica­
tion. Why should we constrain our pursuit? A plausible answer is suggested by Kurt 
Baier, who expands the idea of morality as a constraint: "being moral is following 
rules designed to overrule self-interest whenever it is in the interest of everyone 
alike that everyone should set aside his interest. "2 But perhaps this account [proves 
vacuous. Need it be in the interest of everyone alike that everyone should set aside 
his/her interest? Perhaps not. Perhaps there is no need for morality. 
The political anarchist offers us the picture of a human society that neither 
has nor wants external constraints - a society of peaceable, productive, and com· 
panionable persons whose interactions are blessedly free of all authority or compul­
sion. The political anarchist seeks to convince us of the presence · or at least of the 
possibility of the presence · of an order in human affairs that does not require the 
artifice of politics. The moral anarchist would offer us the comparable picture of a 
human society that neither has nor wants internal constraints · a  society of peace­
able and productive persons who nevertheless are without conscience. The moral 
anarchist would seek to convince us of the. possibility of the presence of an order 
in human affairs that does not require the deeper artifice of morality. This order 
must of course have a foundation, and that foundation is individual interest. 
The classic picture of a world of conscienceless persons is Hobbes' natural 
condition of mankind, and it is far removed from the ideal of moral anarchy. In­
deed, Hobbes depicts an anarchy of a very different sort, a world in which each, 
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bent on his/her own conservation and contentment. finds him herself condemned 
to the war or every man against every man. Jn Hobbes' world the absence of indi,·id­
uaJ conscience and political authority is the absence of aJI order. If Hobbes is right, 
then morality and sovereignty are the necessary defences that human beings erect 
against an intolerable anarchy. But consider another picture of our natural condi­
tion. "All systems or ... restraint, therefore, being .. . completely taken away, the 
obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. 
Every man ... is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to 
brin� both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, 
.... " And the outcome, according to Adam Smith, whose account we are con· 
trasting wi th that of Hobbes, assures mutual benefit. Generalizing from a particular 
instance, he says: "By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign indus· 
try [ a  man J intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a 
manner as its produce may be of greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and 
he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end 
which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for society that it was 
no part oi it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of s·ociety 
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. ,,4 
In quoting Smith I have deliberately omitted one important qualifying 
phrase. When Smith talks of every man being left free to pursue his own interest, 
he inserts the phrase "as long as he does not violate the laws of justice." w,e shall 
need to take note of this qualification. But for the present I wish to consider the 
picture without any qualification · the picture of an order induced by the individ· 
ual pursuit of interest. For it is this picture that suggests thE! possibility of moral 
anarchy. Smith and the laissez faire economists of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries had arrived at one of the most significant discoveries in the 
moral realm - the discovery of a framework of human interaction within which the 
interests of each would harmonize free from any form of constraint, so that individ· 
ual gain and mutual benefit would necessarily converge. Justice would be of con­
cern in establishing the framework, but of no concern within it. This framework is 
the perfectly competitive market. 
We shall consider the characteristics essential to perfect competition · the 
conditions that must be satisfied for it to arise, and that delimit its scope. In this 
way we shall come to understand a form of human interaction that, we shall argue, 
exhibits no need for morality. Morality can have no place in the ideal interactions 
represented by the perfectly competitive market and this is not a fault, but the 
essential virtue of the market. The efficacy of the Invisible Hand does away with 
all need for a Visible Foot · and indeed, makes the application of morality to our 
back.sides indefensible. 
It would, however, be a misunderstanding of our thesis to suppose that it 
affords a full defence of moral anarchy. Although we can not show this here, Hob· 
bes and Smith are complementary, not conflicting, thinkers. There are features of 
our world that resemble the Hobbesian jungle, and we need the constraints of 
conscience and authority to protect us. But the perfectly competitive market is 
not a jungle · indeed, we shall insist that it is at the farthest remove from Hobbesian 
anarchy. In it we need no protection. Morals and markets both have their places • 
but together they are mismatched. 
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II 
Let us now note those features of the workings of the pt"rfe<:Uy competitive 
market that are relevant to our argument. The goods of the market an> its products; 
the bads are the factor sen-ices used in production. Each person wants to consume 
as many products as possible, and as much of each as possible, although desire is 
assumed to diminish as consumption increases. Each also wishes to provide as few 
factor services, and as little ,of each. as possible. and here desire is assumed to dimin· 
ish as supply diminishes. In addition lo production and consumption the market 
is the locus of exchange; the conditions for the optimality of production and ex· 
change may be found in any standard elementary account of economic theory. 
and need not delay us. 
The perfectly competitive market presupposes pri\'ate ownership of all prod· 
ucts and factors of production. Thus it is specified not only by the utility functions 
of those interacting in it, which determine demand. and the produc-tion functions 
which determine supply, but also by an initial distribution olf factors. affording 
each person his/her initial factor endowment. For the purposes of our discussion, 
each person may be defined by his/her factor endowment and his/her utility 
function. The activity of the market proceeds from the initial distribution of fac­
tors, which in relation to the other characteristics of the market is simply a given 
condition. To say that a factor or product is owned by an individual is to say that 
s/he may use' it as s/he pleases in the processes of production. exchange. and con­
sumption. Thus the market involves the entirely free activity of each individual, 
limited only by factors and products that s/he owns, the production functions, that 
determine the possibilities of transforming factors into products, and the utility 
functions of others that determine the possibilities of exchange. The presupposi­
tion of private ownership may therefore be divided into 'two parts: indi\'idual fac· 
tor endowme-nts, and free individual market activity. 
The pe-rfectly competitive market presupposes a second form of privacy in 
the consumption of all products. Each unit good enters into thP utility function of 
only one person . This has a twofold implication. On the one hand all goods must 
be strictly private in the sense that consumption of a unit by one person precludes 
its consumption by another. Food is a purely private good; what one eats, no one 
else can. On the other hand utility functions must be strictly independent; no 
person gains or loses simply from the utilities of others. Each person's utility is 
strictly a function of the goods s/he consumes and the factor services s/he provides. 
Or in other words, bundles of goods consumed and services provided are strictly 
discrete, and each person's utility is determined by and only by the size and com· 
position of his/her bundle. 
The restriction to private goods is of considerable significance in limiting the 
possible scope of the perfectly competitive market. But it does not have the direct 
ethical import of the requirement that utility functions be independent. The idea 
here is happily expressed by John Rawls; people "are conceived as not taking an 
interest in one another's interests."5 In fact his formulation is more restrictive than 
needed; the market requires only that persons be conceived as not taking an inter­
est in the interests of those with whom they exchange. This is Wicksteed's require· 
ment of "non-tuism." Private consumption, like private ownership, is thus divided 
into two parts: private goods, and mutual unconcern. 
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The existence or unowned factors or products, the presence of public goods 
or interdependent utilities, may give rise to economic externalities. The absence of 
externalities, however they may arise, is a further condition of perfect competition. 
An externality arises whenever an act of production or exchange or consumption 
affects the utility of someone who is not pa.rty, or unwillingly party, to it. Such an 
effect may of course be either beneficial or harmful; if beneficial we speak of a 
positive externality or external efficiency; if harmful we speak of a negative extern­
aJity or external inefficiency. 
An example of each may be helpful. Let us suppose that a group of ship­
owners agree to erect a lighthouse to aid the navigation of their ships. They have 
no way or restricting the good provided by their lighthouse to those who bear the 
costs or its provision. Given freedom or the seas, anyone may avail him/herself of 
the navigational aid afforded by the lighthouse. The effect, then, on those ship­
owners not party to the construction of the lighthouse is a positive externality. 
Let us now suppose that a factory owner disposes of the gaseous wastes from 
his/her factory by havi ng them discharged into the atmosphere, thus causing pollu­
tion. If anyone may use the air as s/he pleases - if it is a free good - then there is no 
way to require the factory owner to compensate others for the ill effects of his/her 
method of waste disposal . The effect, then, on any person breathing the polluted 
air is a negative externality. 
Essential to the operation of the perfectly competitive market is the marginal 
matching of supply and demand. Externalities upset this matching. Lighthouses 
tend to be undersupplied; air pollution is ovetsupplied. The reason is straightfor­
ward. Demand is effective only as a willingness to pay the costs of supply. But 
those who benefit from rthe provision of lighthouses have little or no incenrtive to 
pay their costs. Given freedom of the seas, there is no way to channel their demand 
into a user's fee. And so demand is ineffective. Those who supply lighthouses will 
do so only in answer to their own demand - not in answer to the further demand 
that is represented by the non-paying users. Supply will therefore tend to fall short 
of full demand. 
The situation is unhappily reversed with respect to such bads as air pollution. 
Those who create it, given that air is a free good, must pay only its direct costs to 
them and not the costs to others. Hence lack of demand, as it were, does not pre­
vent supply. Air pollution is supplied up to the point at which its marginal cost to 
the suppliers equals its marginal benefits; the additional costs to others have no 
effects in restraining that supply . 
Individual endowments and private goods, free market activity and mutual 
unconcern, and the absence of externalities - these are the characteristics of the per­
fectly competitive market. In it, both production and exchange are carried on un­
der conditions of certainty. Certainty of production is assured by fixed production 
functions representing a known technology. Certainty of exchange is assured by 
known market prices, varying in accordance with aggregate supply and demand, 
but effectively independent of the behavior of any single individual. Although 
prices are determined, given the technology o,f production, purely by the subjec­
tive values. · the preferences · of the individuals interacting in the market, yet they 
present themselves to each as an objective datum, an objective value to wh ich s/he 
must conform in his/her activities. Marxist analysis provides us with a useful term 
for this appearance of objectivity - it is a form of fetishism. 
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Free acti\ity under conditions of certainty is sufficient to ensure that the 
market constantly moves towards an equilibrium condition. An equilibrium is ach· 
ieved if and only if each person's behavior is a best response to that of everyone 
else. And the economist now offers his/her triumphant demonstration that gh·en 
perfect competition, the market equilibrium must also be an optimum . no one 
could be made better off without someone else being worse off. In the outcome 
of the perfectly competitive market. no one oould consume more products given 
the factor services s/he provides, or provide fewer services given the products sfhe 
consumes, unless some other person were to consume fewer products while pro­
viding the same services, or to provide more services without consuming more 
products. Adam Smith's Invisible Hand is thus made visible by the economist's 
analysis. In setting out the conditions for perfect competition we show those fea· 
tures of interaction that ensure that each, intending only his/her own gain, pro· 
motes the benefit of society, in bringing about a mutuaJly beneficial optimum, even 
though this be no part of his{her intention. 
The coincidence of equilibrium and optimum in the outcome of the �rfecitly 
competitive market is central to our argument. In equilibrium, resulting after all 
voluntary exchanges have been made, individual gain is assured, in that each does 
as well as s/he· can, given the actions of the others. In optimum, mutuaJ benefit is 
assured, in that each does as well as s/he can, given the payoffs of the others. It is 
the failure of the equilibrium resulting from the pursuit of individual gain to be 
optimal that is the source of the complaints by Hobbes and others against the 
natural condition of humankind. The market overcomes this failure, and it is the 
coincidence of equilibrium and optimality that is, by contrast, the source of Smith's 
panegyric to the Invisible Hand. But we must not simply dismiss from attention 
those other features of the market that we have noted; they are not merely con di· 
tions of that coincidence. That the market supposes free activity is important in its 
own right. And it is essential that we understand what free activity is. 
Ill 
Consider first the activity of a solitary being, a Robinson Crusoe as we shall 
call him/her. Robinson Crusoe is free to use his/her capacities in whatever way will 
best satisfy his/her interests given the external circumstances in which s/he finds 
him/herself. His/her capacities will limit the satisfaction s/he can provide for his/her 
interests. Conversely, his/her interests will limit the use s/he can make of his/her 
capacities - not in limiting what s/he can do but what s/he finds worth doing. But 
we should not suppose that these limitations constrain his/her freedom. One is free 
insofar as one is able, without interference or other constraint, to direct one's 
capacities to the service of one's interests. Furthermore, since Robinson Crusoe en­
joys the full product of his/her labors, what s/he consumes is whats/he produces, 
and so the value of what s/he consumes is equal to the value of whats/he produces. 
But also, the marginal costs and benefits of his/her productive activity are equal; 
the value, to him/her of the last unit good s/he produces equals the cost, to him/ 
her, of the last unit factor service s/he supplies for its production. Or at least, Rob· 
inson Crusoe has only him/herself to blame shound this marginal equivalence not 
be satisfied, since s/he is free to cease his/her productive efforts when the cost of 
further production exceeds the benefit of consuming the good produced. 
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The �ffect of the market is to ensure. at the interpersonal le\•el. the same 
freedom that Robinson Crusoe enjoys in his her solitude. while making possible 
the enormously expanded range of benefits afforded by exchange and the division 
of labor . and, in the long run, also by in\·estment. As we have noted. the strictly 
competitive market precludes all strategic interaction: from the standpoint of each 
individual, the production and demand functions in terms olf which s he chooses 
his/her maximizing course of action are fixed, "natural" circumstances Thus al­
though the use of any particular individual may make of his/her Lalents or the satis­
faction s/he may secure for his/her interests depends on considerations of aggre­
gate supply and demand, and thus on the Lalents and interests of all those inter­
acting in the market, yet no single individual is i n  a position to control the terms of 
interaction for others. 
Each person is thus a Robinson Crusoe, even in the market. Of course, the 
existence of other persons, and the possibilities of exchange, affect the constraints 
on individual behavior. Not. only his/her own capacities, but the capacities of others, 
will limit the satisfaction any individual can provide for his/her interests, and this 
in two ways. First, the overall productive capacity of a society is limited by the 
capacities of its members. But second, the return each person may expect for the 
exercise of his/her capacities in the provision of factor service depends on the ex­
tent to which those capacities are in relations of mutual substitutability with the 
capacities of others. Scarce capacities secure the equivalent of what economists 
term rent, and this rent adds to the means whereby the fortunate possessor of the 
scarce capacities may satisfy his/her interests. Hockey arenas that are usually half 
full sell out when Wayne Gretzky comes to play: the resulting salary that Gretzky 
commands includes a substantial rent for his irreplaceable talents. 
Furthermore, not only one's own interests, but also the interests of others, 
atrect the use one can make of one's capacities, in l imiting what one finds worth doing. 
Wayne Gretzky's talents on ice would be of little benefit to him were there no 
audience for hockey. But these limitations are the interpersonal analogue of the 
limitations experienced by Robinson Crusoe alone on his/her island. If we agree 
that Crusoe's freedom is not constrained by his/her limited talents and inte·rests in 
solitary action, then we should agree that his/her freedom is not constrained by 
limited talents and interests when s/he leaves his/her island to join the market. 
Robinson Crusoe, we noted, enjoys the full product of his/her labors. Simi· 
larly, those who engage in market interaction enjoy the full product of their labors. 
Under standard conditions, the value of total market output is equal to the sum of 
the marginal values ead1 person contributes to that output - the sum of the marginal 
differences each makes. In the free exchanges of the marke·t, where all external­
ities are absent, each person may expect a return equal In value to his/her contri· 
bution. Thus the income each receives, or the value of the goods each is able to 
consume, is equal to the contribution s/he makes, or the marginal differences s/he 
adds to the value of the total product. And, also, as with Robinson Crusoe, the 
marginal costs and benefits of his/her activity are equal. The value to each persqn 
of the last unit good s/he produces or obtains in exchange is equal to the cost, to 
him/her, of the last unit factor service s/he contributes to production, or the last 
unit good s/he offers in exchange. The market, then, yields an optimal outcome in 
which returns to individuals equal contributions made by those same individuals. 
And this emerges, not through any deliberate intent on the part of the individuals, 
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each of whom seeks only to maximize his/her gain, but because of the structure of 
interaction in conditions of perfect competition. 
IV 
The coincidence of equilibrium and optimum in the outcome of free market 
activity under conditions of perfect competition is taken by laissez faire econom­
ists to justify the "obvious and simple system of natural liberty." Any restriction 
of this liberty, any interference with the natural working of the market, could be 
neither rationally nor morally acceptable. Many forms of interference would of 
course affect the optimality of the market. yielding an outcome which would leave 
each person worse off than s/he need be given the returns of the others. But even 
if optimality were preserved, interference would involve a redistribution of products 
that would leave some individuals better off and! others worse off than they had 
been in free interaction. What could entitle the beneficiaries to their gains. taken 
at the expense of their fellows? And what could reconcile those fellows to their 
losses? The sole activity affecting the market that could be rational or right is sim­
ply to preserve it - to prevent force or fraud, those cardinal virtues of Hobbes' 
natural condition of war that are the great enemies of free and mutually beneficial 
interaction. 
The argument by which the laissez faire economists wolll d seek an end to 
political constraints is clearly also an argument for an end to moral constraints. If 
each is not morally free to pursue his/her own gain, then some must benefit al the 
expense of others. Where earlier thinkers saw in the unbridled pursuit of individual 
interests, the ultimate source of conflict in human affairs, the defenders of laissez 
faire see in it rather the basis of the true harmony that results from the fullest com­
possible satisfaction of thos-e interests. The traditiional moralist iis told that his/her 
services are not wanted. 
Superficially it may seem that the argumenrt of the advocates of laissez f.aire 
rests on the claim that an outcome which satisfies the two rationality properties -
equilibrium and optimum - must also be morally right. But a more profound inter­
pretation of their argument is that morality has no application in conditions of 
perfect competition. The outcome of the market is neither morally right nor mor­
ally wrong, because the coincidence of equilibrium and optimum under conditi.ons 
of free interaction removes both need and rationale for the cons.traints that moral­
ity provides, and that enable us to distinguish situations as right or wrong. Moral 
constraints arise only in the gap created when the two rationality properties are in 
conflict, so that mutual benefit is not assured by the pursuit of individual gain. We 
assess outcomes as right or wrong when, but only when, maximizing one's utility 
given the actions of others fails to maximize that utility given the utilities of others. 
We endorse this intrepretation; market outcomes are neither right nor wrong. 
We propose to argue that features of our common conception of [persons as rational 
individual agents - or at least as potentially rational individual agents, and of our 
common conception of morality as an impartial constraint on the individual pursuit 
of self-interest or gain, lead to the conclusion that moral assessment is restricted to 
non-market activity. But we must emphasize that our argument does not yield a 
straightforward defence of laissez faire in economic practice .. Fill"St of all, its tradi­
tional defenders supposed, as we do not, that the perfectly competitive market was 
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realized, or almost realized, or at least could be reaJized, in most of our economic 
interactions. EssenliaJly they failed to appreciate the una\'oidable presence of ex· 
t.emaJ errects in almost all contexts. Hence they derived policy conclusions from 
their basic normative stance that in fact require factual premisses that seem false or 
at best dolllbtful. Our concern is to show that morality has no place in an ideaJ con· 
text or interaction , not to claim that this ideal has direct practical application. 
But in the second place the defenders of laissez faire failed to appreciate the 
normative character of certain of the presuppositions of the market. We have noted 
that the market presupposes private consumption, and this is a factual matter. Con· 
sumption or a unit good by one person either does or does not preclude i.ts con· 
sumption by another, and the utilities of one person either a:re or are not indepen· 
dent of the utilities of another. But the market also presupposes private ownership 
of factors and goods, and this is a normative matter. The initial factor endowment 
of each person is taken as given, but why should it be so taken? Each product and 
each factor of production is owned by some individual who may use it as s/he 
pleases as far as production, exchange, and consumption are concerned, but why 
should individuals exercise this control? 
The presupposition of private ownership would seem to raise questions about 
both the rationality and the alleged non-morality of market interaction. These 
questions are especially pressing since in any market there are many possible opti· 
ma, and the actual market outcome is determined by the initial factor endowments 
of the interacting individuals. It is that optimum which yields each individual a re· 
tum equal to his/her contribution, but the factor services an individual contributes 
must depend on the factors s/he possesses, and so on his/her endowment. Of course, 
the contribution each individual makes depends also on the technology available 
for the conversion of factors into products and the preferences that determine de· 
mand. But all else remaining the same, a different initial distribution of factors 
leads to a different final distribution of goods. 
Our response is to distinguish the conditions of the market from its. opera· 
tion. The operation of the market. is to convert an initial situation specified in 
terms of individual factor endowments into a final outcome specified in terms of a 
distribution of goods or products among the same individuals. Since the market 
yields an outcome both optimal and in equilibrium its operation is shown to be 
rational, and since it proceeds in terms of the free activity of individuals, our claim 
is that its rationality then leaves no place for moral assessment. Given the initial 
situation of the market, its outcome cannot but be fully justified. 
But neither the operation of the market nor its outcome can show, or can 
even tend to show, that its initial situation is also either rationally or morally 
acceptable. Nothing then in our argument about the inapplicability of moral cate· 
gories to the operation of the market can show that the initial factor endowments 
themselves raise no moral issues. In his analysis of the optimality of perfect com· 
petition, David Winch notes that "The perfectly competitive system is dependent 
on private ownership of 'factors of production'" so that "the essence of the system 
is that distributive justice is an attribute of the inputs. "6 With this we fully agree. 
Any defence of particular market arrangements must include a defence of the in· 
puts, of the initial factor endowments. But as Winch notes, "the acceptance of an 
initial distribution of factors ... precludes our having value judgments about the dis· 
tribution of utilities." The operation of the market does not raise any further eval· 
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uative issues. Market arrangements are fair if, but of course only if, they result 
from fair initiaJ conditions. 
v 
In arguing for the inapplicability of moral categories to the operation of the 
market, we mlllSt not merely beg the question by presupposing that morality must 
follow rationality. It would be too easy a victory to show that. givt>n tht> initial 
situation of the market, the final outcome follows from interaction among individ· 
uals that satisfies both indiv'i dual and collective rationality, in yielding an outcome 
both in equilibrium and optimal, and to rest our case at that point. Rather, we 
begin from the common understanding of morality as an impartial constraint on 
the direct pursuit of individual gain, of utility. What we must then ask is whether 
the market exhibits any form of partiality that would justify, from a strictly moral 
standpoint, the constraint needed to overcome it. 
Perhaps the best way to decide this matter is to ask whether any individual 
could reasonably claim that the operation of the market affected him/her in any 
differential way, whether favorably or unfavorably, taking his/her initial endow­
ment as gi ven, or whether s/he could enter any reasonable complaint or objection 
against the market outcome, taking its starting point as given. Now here several 
features of the market are clearly relevant. First, the presupposition of free activity 
ensures that no one is subject to any form of compulsion, or to any type of con­
straint not already present in the actions of a solitary individual. Each chooses for 
him/herself what to produce, what to exchange, and what to consume, against a 
known technology of production and a known set of prices, which neither s/he nor 
any other individual is able to affect. If the market were to bring about an outcome, 
albeit optimal and in equilibrium, through the exercise of compulsion by some 
mndividual or group on others, then we might well see the need for a Visible Foot 
to set things right. But given the freedom of market interaction, the introduction 
of moral constraints would mn effect be to introduce the very compulsion that in 
our view morality is intended to counteract. Since the market provides nothing to 
correct, the introduction of a corrective device would itself stand itn need of remedy. 
Second, the absence of externalities ensures that no one is affected, whether 
beneficially or harmfully, by any market activity to which s/he has not chosen to 
be party . Not only has each acted freely, but also each has interacted freely. No 
one is then in the position of either a free-rider or a parasite. A f'ree-rider obtains a 
benefit without paying all or part of its cost. A parasite in obtaining a benefit dis· 
places the cost or part of the cost on to some other person. R.ecall our previous 
examples. The .shipowners whose vessels take navigational advantage of a lighthouse 
although they have paid neither for its erection nor for its maintenance are free­
riders. Although they do not displace costs on to others, they do gain without pay­
itng any of the costs required to provide the gain. The factory-owner who disposes 
of his/her gaseous wastes by polluting the atmosphere without compensating those 
who suffer the pollution s/he causes is a parasite, diisplacing part of the costs of his/ 
her activities on to others. And note that s/he would remain a parasite even if 
others were to buy him/her out of polluting, for s/he would then be charging them 
the costs of an alternative method of disposing of his/her wastes. 
A free-rider does not make others worse off by his/her behavior. Those who 
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erect and maintain the lighthouse may be supposed to maximize their utility in so 
doing. But s/he obtains an added benefit that they do not enjoy. so that the out· 
come affects him/her in a differentially favorable way. The parasite does directly 
make others worse off. His/her activity may seem more evidently unfair than that 
of the Cree-rider. Indeed, s/he directly violates the conditions of free activity in 
forcing others to interact with him/her in a manner not of their choosing. S/he 
benefits differentially, and others suffer differentially. But although the parasite is 
doubly at fault, yet both undermine the impartiality found in interaction in which 
each pays the costs of the benefits s/he obtains. 
The equation of income to the marginal product contributed ensures just 
this impartiality. Not only does each interact freely with his/her fellows, but each 
benefits from and only from the contribution s/!he makes. One might freely choose 
to enter into differentially unfavorable interaction with others because of the lack 
of better alternatives. The slave may be better off as a slave than s/he would be as 
a Robinson Crusoe; given a choice between slavery and solitude s/he might freely 
choose slavery. But the slave does not benefit from interaction to the extent of 
his/her contribution. The market rules out all such biased forms of interaction. 
Despite propaganda to the contrary, wage slavery is not and cannot be a feature of 
the market. 
Third, the optimality of the outcome, given that it results from free activity 
in the absence of extemaEities, is sufficient to show that any alternative must exhi­
bit partiality. For every alternative must involve a diminution of some person's 
utility, and we may treat this diminution either as a loss of benefits or an increase 
in costs. It the former, then the person will not receive some benefit for which in 
free interaction s/he paid the cost; if the latter then the person must pay some cost 
in addition to those which in free interaction were sufficient to cover all Ms/her 
benefits. In either case the person's interests are prejudicially affected. 
Throughout our discussion, the absence of externalities has played a crucial 
role. We have argued that their presence occasions free-ridership or parasitism, and 
these are clearly incompatible with the impartiality demanded by morality. Typic­
ally, their presence also breaks the link between equilibrium and optimum demand­
ed by full rationality. As the role of externalities makes clear, rational and moral 
problems prove to be very closely linked. The market is happily free from both. Or 
so we tentatively hold. 
VI 
We must now show that this tentative conclusion is not undermined by other 
presuppositions of the purely competitive market. As we have noted, each individ­
ual is defined in relation to the market by his/her utility function and factor endow· 
ment. In claiming that the operation of the market is impartial, we are claiming 
that it is impartial to persons so defined or conceived. Let us say that the utility 
function and factor endowment together constitute a person's market self. Insofar 
as an individual identifies with his/her market self s/he will of course find the oper­
ation of the market to be impartial, and will consider any supposedly moral con­
straints on that operation to be in fact immoral - an exhibition of partiality. Now 
one can hardly fail to identify with one's utility function - the measure of one's 
considered preferences - but one may not identify with one's factor endowment. 
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One may consider it purely arbitrary. One may agree that, gi\'en pri\'ate property 
in the factors of production, market interaction is uniquely rational and impartial. 
But one may reject, not merely one's particular endowment. but the \'ery idea of 
an endowment. One may suppose that there is no non-arbitrary way to introduce 
market interaction. 
To some extent this supposition should appear less plausible in the light of 
our discussion of free activity, and in particular by the idea that in market interac­
tion the freedom of solitary activity is preserved. Although Robinson Crusoe's nat­
ural endowment may be in one sense purely arbitrary, in that s/he would have no 
ground for complaint were it other than it is, yet what it is is in another sense not 
at all arbitrary. In the solitary condition in which Crusoe finds him/herself, his/her 
endowment is whatever s/he can make use of. It thus affords a determinate and 
natural starting point for his/her behavior. If we endeavor to extend this concep­
tion of natural endowment to social interaction, we find that what one can make 
use of is not determinately established. It may seem that either endowments over­
lap, so that, as Hobbes insists, every person has a right to everything, even to an­
others body,7 or that endowments shrink to zero, so that no one has a right to any 
thing, even to his/her own body. But this is not so. We may define a person's basic 
endowment as what s/he can make use of, and what no one else can make use of in 
that person's absence. Then each person's basic endowment will comprise his/her 
physical and mental capacities. They are immediately present for that person's own 
use, and they are present for the use of others only insofar as that person is also 
present. We might also propose that one's basic endowment includes what one is 
able to use directly and what others can use only indirectly 1 through one's own 
use. I can use my eyes directly to see with, but you can use them only indirectly. 
The transplantation of bodily organs however complicates this alternative account. 
You can use my liver directly if it is successfully implanted in your body, but even 
so you can gain the use of it only by taking it from me, and for this my presence is 
required. 
A person's endowment may include other factors of production, and indeed 
must do so for perfect competition to be possible, so that we shall require a non­
arbitrary way of moving from the basic endowment to those other factors. We can 
not here explore how this might be done. What suffices for present purposes is that 
each person begins with a conception of him/herself that includes his/her physical 
and mental characteristics as a non-arbitrary endowment. For each then will consid· 
er interaction with his/her fellows to satisfy the condition of impartiality only inso­
far as it affords him/her a return equal to the services s/he contributes, through the use 
of his/her capacities. And while this is not yet sufficient to rule out all alternatives 
to the market as partial, it meets the criticism that the starting point of the market 
is purely arbitrary. 
Before leaving this matter, however, we must at least recognize a complicat­
ing consideration. The market return for the use of any factor may include two 
rather different components. First, and necessarily, the price of a factor must in­
clude its cost of supply. Each person, in bringing his/her abilities to production and 
exchange, receives a return covering the costs of denloping and maintaining those 
abilities. Were this not so, interaction would not be voluntary ; if each did not re­
ceive his/her cost of supply then factors would be brought to the market only 
under threat of coercive penalties. But to the extent to which certain factors are in 
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fixed supply - Lo the extient to which certain talents and abilities are nol freely 
substitutable in the market - there is also, as we ha\'e noted. the possibility that 
demand for the goods produced with the use of these factors will bring about a 
market price that includes factor rent. In this case a person benefits from the scar­
city of his/her particular talents and abilities - a scarcity whic-h is of course 1entirely 
accidental from his/her standpoint. S/he receives more than is ne�ded to induce 
him/her to bring those factors to the market; rent is by defini'lion a return over and 
above the cost of supply. 
In a market, scarce factors command rent. This is a factual claim. To those 
who identify with their factor endowments, it is no more than a factuaJ claim. To 
those who do not, it raises a question of justification. If the operation of the mark­
et includes the provision of rent, then is there not at least some room for the moral 
assessment of market out.comes? I think not; the coincidence of equilibrium and 
optimum in an outcome reached through free interaction leaves no place for the 
mutually beneficial constraints of morality. But I shall leave the problem of rent as 
unfinished business; here, if anywhere, those who would claim that markets stand 
in need of morality must find their opening. 
VII 
We tu:rn to our final theme - the requirement of mutual unconcern, or the 
independence of utilities. The conception of persons as taking no interest. in one 
another's interesl� is fundamental to moral, as well as economic, theory. For we 
suppose with Kant that moral constraints must apply in the absence of other-direct­
ed interests, that they must apply whatever one's individual values may happen to 
be. Where we differ from Kant is in finding an area of human interaction fr1ee from 
these constraints. 
The assumption of mutual unconcern may be criticized because it is thought 
to be generally false, or because, true or false, it is held to reflect an unduly nasty 
view of human nature - a view that is incompatible with both morality and society. 
But such criticism would misunderstand the role of the assumption. Of course per­
sons exhibit concern for others, but their concern is usually, and quite properly, 
particular and partial. It is neither unrealistic nor pessimistic to suppose that be­
yond the ties of blood and friendship, which are necessarily limited in their scope, 
persons exhibit little positive concern for others. Where personal relationships cease 
only a weak negative concern remains, manifesting itself perhaps in a general will­
ingness to refrain from force and fraud if others do likewise, and in a particular 
willingness to offer assistance in extreme situations - in, for example, the desire to 
aid victims of disasters, whether natural or man-made - but that is compatible with 
supposing that each should look after him/herself, with a helping hand to friends 
and kin, in the ordinary affairs of life. 
The assumption of mutual unconcern is to be employed in analysing the pos­
sibility and characteristics of moral and social relationships in the limiting, but 
practically important, case in which particular ties among persons are either absent, 
or if present, too weak to sustain such relationships. One of the characteristics of 
most human societies is the absence of any form of effective and mutually 'benefic­
ial interaction among persons not tied by some particular bond. Thus the funda­
mental importance of kinship systems; one cooperates with one's kin because there 
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is a bond of trust, of assuranct> that those with whom onE' interacts will not prO\·e 
unmindful of one's interests. But other persons are potential enemies; the absence o f  
any determinate bond implies a lack of concern that i s  thought to make any coop­
erative relationship impossoble. The fundamental distinction between us and them, 
blood-brothers and strangers. has limited the scope of cooperation for much of 
humankind. We inrnke the assumption of mutual unconcern to determine if that 
limitation is an inescapable e\"il of the human condition. 
The superiority of market society over its predecessors and rivals. as provid· 
ing a framework for human interaction , is manifE'st in its capacity to overcome this· 
limitation and direct mutual unconcern to mutual benefit. ThE' perfectly competi· 
tive market requires no bond among those engaged in it, other than those bonds 
that they freely create as each pursues his/her own gain. The impersonality of mark· 
et society, which has been the object of wide criticism, and at the root of charges 
of anomie and alienation in modern life, is instead the basis of the fundamental 
liberation afforded by the market. Men and women are freed from the need to es· 
tablish more particular bonds, whether these be affective or coercive, in order to 
interact beneficially. The division between siblings and strangers disappears, and is 
not replaced by a new division in which subjects cooperate only so long as they 
remain under the watchful eye of a sovereign. Against the market background of 
mutual unconcern, particular human relationships of trust and affE'ction may flour· 
ish on a voluntary basis. Those who hanker after the close-knit relationships of other 
and earlier forms of human society are in effect seeking to nee from the fre-edom 
to choose those in whose interests one will take an interest. 
The liberation effected by market society cannot be unlimited, and is not 
without real dangers. In time, more and more human relationships and activities are 
brought within the scope of the market, or are interpreted in concepts derived from 
the mutual unconcern present in the market. In freeing us from the need to develop 
affective bonds in every social interaction, or to accept coercion as the only alter· 
native, market society may seem to encourage a conception of human beings as 
unrelated individual atoms that undermines the possibility of genuinely affective 
ties. Complete liberation may end in alienation. But wherever individuality may 
end, its emergence, except as the privilege of a numerically insignificant elite, is 
made possible only by the market. 
The conception of morality that is associated with the idea of interaction 
among mutually unconcerned persons is of course the idea of morality as a set of 
constraints that any rational person must acknowledge. Such a morality is possible 
if the constraints are generated simply by the acknowledgement that they make 
possible the more effective realization of one's interests, whatever those interests 
may be. One is not then able to escape morality by professing a lack o f  moral feel­
ing or concern, or of some other particular interest or attitude, because morality 
assumes no such affective basis. Hume believed the source of morality to lie in the 
sympathetic transmission of our feelings from one person to another. But Kant, 
rightly, insisted that morality cannot depend on such particular psychological phen­
omena, however benevolent and humane their effect may be, and however univer· 
sally they may be found. The Kantian insistence that morality binds independently 
of the nature and content of our affections is thus Cully expressed in the insistence 
that morality be based on the assumption of mutual unconcern. 
From this standpoint the market is clearly non-moral. For in the operation 
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o( a system of perfect competition there are no constraints that mutually uncon­
cerned persons must or rationally would acknowledge. Constraints would be not 
merely pointless, but positively harmful to their interaction. The essence of the 
market is to afford an area or freedom, rationalized by its optimality. The early 
defenders of laissez faire may perhaps be forgjven for the enthusiasm with which 
they welcomed this idea, an enthusiasm that led them to apply it without con­
sidering how far perfect competition could be realized in human affairs. We do not 
suppose that actual market societies have realiz.ed, or could have realized, the ideal 
of free and optimal interaction, in its full form. And while we may believe that 
those societies that have professed the market ideal have come closer to its realiza­
tion than those that have pursued other objectives, yet in the absence of an ade­
quate theory of the second-best we may not even assert this lesser claim with con­
fidence. We must remain at the level of the ideal. 
The perfectly competitive market offers us a picture of harmony · between 
individual and society, between freedom and welfare. To be sure, we must not ig· 
nore the laws or justice, which set the initial conditions · the endowments of the 
men and women in the market, and in requiring that those endowments be respect· 
ed, limits interaction to exchanges free from force or fraud. But given the condi­
tions of the market, we may, and must, let ourselves be guided by an Invisible Hand, 
with no need to submit our backsides to that Visible Foot, morality. 
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